When analysing flood risk governance in France since the beginning of the 1980s, central government appears as a predominant actor. However, to understand contemporary French flood risk governance (FRG), it is also important to highlight how this domination has progressively been undermined since 1982. First, a decentralisation movement has been initiated whose main characteristics are an increasing involvement of local governments and a difficulty for national authorities to maintain their predominant role. The second main change is a diversification in flood risk strategies going together with a diversification in the definition of the flood risk issue. FRG is not a sole matter of protection through defence, preparation, and recovery strategies anymore. Both prevention and mitigation strategies have progressively gained in legitimacy. It is in the latter that local governments and stakeholders have increasingly got involved and have taken up responsibilities and initiatives. The paper focuses on the explanatory factors behind both stability and change, and especially on the ongoing tension, between path dependency factors (i.e. state power and role) and organisational capability of local actors.
Introduction
Most often, France is described as a strongly centralised state, where most public policies are constructed by central government. In the field of flood risk management (FRM), national authorities clearly remain a predominant actor today. FRM is defined as a national solidarity issue and the central government sets the rules for land planning in flood-prone areas.
However, beyond this general feature, French flood risk governance (FRG) has also encountered importantalthough incremental -changes within the last decades, and among them a general trend of government drawback since the 1980s. This moment constituted a crucial institutional and political turning point in France. Following the election of the socialist F. Mitterrand as president, a large decentralisation process was launched and led to the devolution of large competences to regional and local authorities. Within this context, the central government (with a long tradition) on the one hand and local municipalities (as newcomers) on the other hand have become (and still remain today) the two main actors of French FRG. However, changes have occurred progressively.
First, if we analyse FRM through a set of strategies (prevention, defence, mitigation, preparation, and recovery 1 ), there has been an important diversification of flood risk management strategies (FRMSs) in France within the last decade. This has given a prevailing role to prevention (and as such proactive planning, as defined by Hegger et al., 2016) -via the definition by central government of nonbuildable areas -rather than defence and preparation (both strategies traditionally dominated by the central government). Likewise, local authorities have progressively invested in mitigation measures, mainly by reducing the vulnerability of buildings and promoting flood retention techniques. Second, redistribution of power and competences has led to a broadening of the set of actors involved 1 While flood defence and flood mitigation focus on reducing the likelihood and magnitude of flood hazards, flood prevention helps to reduce exposure, whereas flood preparation and recovery both deal with the potential consequences of floods (Hegger et al., 2016, p. 9). in flood risk governance arrangements (FRGA) .
2 This is particularly the case with the rise of urban agglomerations which have progressively gained competences at the expense of municipalities since the 1990s.
The aim of this article is to analyse and explain stabilities and changes in French FRG for the last three decades, as a contribution to understand 'how do countries change path in a domain where path dependencies are normally strong' (Wiering et al., 2017) . In this paper, we intend to understand how the relatively stable French FRG has accommodated to changes during this period. We will also identify the main explanatory factors (if any) of such accommodation.
First, we present the conceptual framework within which we have examined the French case for this paper. This framework is based on a theoretical background presented by Wiering et al. (2017) in the introductory chapter of this special issue. Then we present our method. In terms of results, the paper first analyses and explains stability in the French FRGA (during the period 1980-2015) before focusing on the drivers of change during the same period. Last, we discuss the existing tensions created by those changes within the French FRG and we provide a prospective vision of the future for FRG in France.
Conceptual framework
In order to assess stability and changes of the French FRG, we conduct an analysis on French FRMS over the period through the policy arrangements approach (PAA) framework (Van Tatenhove et al., 2000; Wiering and Arts, 2006; Wiering and Crabbé, 2006) . In their article, Wiering et al. (2017) mobilise this framework and offer theoretical backgrounds and working assumptions for empirically studying stability and change in FRG. On one hand, they elaborate theories of path dependency and institutional stability. On the other hand, they identify various factors, such as the role of policy entrepreneurs, actor-coalitions, the role of trends and shock events to understand the drivers for change in FRG. Based on literature, Wiering et al. (2017) have composed a table containing 'forces of stability' as well as 'forces of change'. They relate these forces with the four dimensions discerned in the PAA: actors and coalitions, rules, resources, and discourses. The forces of stability and change mentioned in their summarising Table 2 ( Wiering et al., 2017) , are used hereafter as if it were guiding 'hypotheses' for explaining stability and change in FRG in France.
This framework has led us to analyse the drivers for change and stability in the French FRM and more specifically the contributions of the two main actors:
• central government which has traditionally gathered a wide variety of resources and power in its hands in the field of FRM (described as 'Goliath'); • local authorities (mainly municipalities, about 36 000 'Davids' in France) which were newcomers in the 1980s, with little resources and legitimacy to act against the flood risk (in discourses) but have progressively become major actors.
Method
This paper is based on the research carried out in the framework of the EU-FP7 STAR-FLOOD project (www.starflood. eu). This project has compared FRG in six European Union (EU) member states (Belgium, England, France, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden). In each country, the research has been based on an extensive literature review, as well as a collation of 'grey' literature. In France, about 64 semistructured interviews with key actors involved in FRM (most were face-to-face, and a small number conducted by telephone) were conducted. We attempted to cover the main institutions dealing with the flood issue both at national and local levels and all FRMSs. We interviewed civil servants in ministries, public experts, parliamentarians, but also representatives from the insurance sector, civil servants from local administrative bodies (municipalities, Départements, river Basin Water Boards, syndicates) and private interests, such as private economic actors or associations. Our results have provided a vision of FRG at the national level but three case studies have also been carried out, where interviews were supplemented with fieldwork visits guided by local actors.
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The analysis presented in the paper is therefore mainly based on the views expressed by policymakers and practitioners operating at all spatial scales. Participants were questioned on FRG in general, but this also led to important insights into its evolutions in the near future.
FRG in France today and its evolution
Before analysing drivers for change and stability in the French FRM (results sections), it is important to briefly describe FRG in France today. First, all FRMS (as they were 2
The concept of FRGA refers to the arrangement of actors, rules, resources, and discourses united under the shared goal of FRM (Hegger et al., 2016, p. 1) . The notion of 'arrangement' refers to the 'temporary stabilisation of the content and organisation of a policy domain ' (Van Tatenhove et al., 2000; Wiering et al., 2017). identified in the STAR-FLOOD project) are present in France: defence, prevention, mitigation, preparation, and recovery. Within those five strategies and the FRGA which derive from them, the main actors are the French central government and local public authorities. Civil society and the private sector are much less involved.
Defence and preparation are at the core of French historical flood policy and mainly dominated by the central government. Preparation mainly means civil security: it is an intrinsically centralised and multirisk mission. Operationally, state services (at Département level) and municipalities manage civil security procedures. Defence represents the most dominant strategy in terms of public investment and the national authorities keep a major position through legislative initiative and control of procedures, while responsibility for infrastructures is devolved to the municipal level. However, prevention is the main strategy in terms of social and political legitimacy today: central government plays a major role in defining non-buildable areas at the local level. The principal resources for FRM through land-use changes come from the National Fund for Major Natural Hazards (NFMNH, also known as the 'Barnier Fund'), which is funded by taxes on home insurance contracts. Prevention is part of a broader planning culture that is dominated by the principle of rigorous restrictions on construction in risk areas. Within this strategy, tensions between centralisation and decentralisation processes are at stake. Recovery is also a characteristic pillar of the French welfare system. It is a competence of central government through the Natural Disasters Fund, which relies operationally on insurance companies and insured clients as the main (compulsory) contributors. It can be considered to be one of the main features of the French flood policy. This arrangement results from a mix of centralised and private-public governance. Recovery is based on the constitutional principle of national solidarity. The Natural Disaster Compensation Scheme (also called 'CAT-NAT' system) embodies the solidarity principle.
At last, mitigation does not represent a strategy in and of itself. Rather, it is a set of measures to support other strategies and it is mainly associated with the water sector. However, the discourse on mitigation is powerful. Municipalities and intermunicipal structures are the main actors for reducing the vulnerability of buildings and flood retention techniques (bottom-up approach).
To conclude on this snapshot of the French FRG, we complete it by a rapid presentation of the institutional and regulatory evolutions of the French FRM within the last three decades (see Figure 1) . Two main movements can be pointed out:
• on the one hand the institutional and political decentralisation processes together with the regular attempts to consolidate local authorities (upper side of the figure); • on the second hand (lower side of the figure) the successive reforms of the French risk policies which strengthened the prevention strategy in the hands of the central government but also organise the diversification of the policy. The development of partnerships funding programmes acronymed PAPI (Programmes d'Action pour la Prévention des Inondations, Action Programmes for Flood Prevention), aiming at coordinating all the FRM stakeholders at the relevant scale (basin or sub-basin scales), appears to be an important tool which strengthened the diversification of FRMS. 
Policy actors and coalitions
• Entrepreneurs highlighting perception of suboptimality of governance and approach
• Strong pressure by specific interests (actor coalitions)
• Fixed costs and increasing returns through large investments in flood infrastructure (sunk costs)
• Learning effects: evolution of strong expert body of knowledge and strong epistemic community
Power and resources • Doubts on increasing costs of flood infrastructure/maintenance or sudden financial cutbacks, opening alternative options
• New expertise (learning)
• Law has an important stabilising effect in the formalisation of rules and procedures This rapid presentation of the French FRG and its evolution already introduces us to the trends of stability and change we will analyse in the following sections. Referring to the biblical story of David and Goliath we analyse and assess if, within French FRG, central government takes the shape of a Goliath able to stabilise FRG, or if local governments can be, as David, able to unsettle Goliath's policy.
Result 1: assessing and explaining stability in French FRG Stability: when goliath gathers FRM legal instruments in his hands Two main stable features characterise the French FRG over the period under analysis. First the fact that FRM is considered a public issue, and in relation to that first statement, the centralised management of flood issues.
Stemming from our analysis, the national solidarity principle characterises FRM in France and constitutes a strong explaining factor for stability. In fact, as far as natural hazards are concerned, French law is based on the key constitutional principle of national solidarity, which is an important pillar of French policy on flood management (Larrue et al., 2016, p. 36) . The solidarity principle is present in discourses, rules, resources, as well as actors and actors' coalitions. The Natural Disaster Compensation Scheme (also called 'CAT-NAT') illustrates the importance of this principle for the management of flood risk in France. CAT-NAT operates via a super-fund collected on residential insurance premiums, involving the national • New expertise at the local level.
N/A
Example: Dikes have now become essential to protect areas whose development was formally impossible without them.
Example: New local taxes on water and flood risk management (FRM).
Rules of the game • Law: strong legal principles strengthen centralised actors' powers
• New rules: decentralisation legal framework
• New rules: new requirements for an integrated FRM Example: Constitutional principal of national solidarity to cope with disasters.
Example: Decentralisation law (1982).
Example: Floods Directive (2007).
Policy discourses
• Adaptive expectations: the image of the central state as the guardian of public safety is largely shared by the public.
• New ideas and counternarratives: subsidiarity
• New ideas and counternarratives: integrated FRM Example: Shock events tend to legitimate the traditional centralised public safetyoriented policy.
Example: New local responsibilities on water and FRM.
Example: 'Zero risk does not exist'.
J Flood Risk Management 11 (2018) 261-270community as a whole. Insurers are covering the risk of natural disasters at a rate fixed by the central government through an additional contribution paid by insured households and calculated at a single rate determined by a Ministerial Decree (it has been 12% since 2009), which finances the CAT-NAT system. This legal requirement applies to all French home insurance contracts. As the penetration rate of this insurance is very high (98%), almost everyone is protected. This amount collected is used for paying out compensation to flood and natural risk damages. Within this scheme, the central government decides on the design and operational mechanisms for the system and intervenes to determine the legal insurance obligation, insurance rates and acknowledgement of 'natural disaster' status, opening the way to insurance compensation. Central government also ultimately reinsures the insurance companies in the event of an extreme catastrophic event (e.g. a major flood in Paris or an important earthquake in Nice area). Within this system, the private sector is merely a manager and has no influence on legal operational aspects.
Our analysis highlights a second stabilising factor of French FRG. From the 1980s until today, the central government dominates French FRG by defining the objectives and rules of risk policy and controlling their effectiveness. French FRG is organised according to stable principles and features. Considering the governance arrangement of the defence strategy, one can say that it has been reinforced in the last two decades by the determination of safety standards, whereas preparation and recovery governance arrangements remain similar to their initial design. As for prevention, the long-lasting monopoly of central government services over risk mapping and building regulations in flood-prone areas has been reinforced since 1982, in particular by the Barnier Act (which introduced the Plans de Prévention du Risque d'inondation [PPRi]). In 1995, the Barnier Act gave back competences for risk mapping to the central government, whereas the former Plans d'Exposition aux Risques created in 1982 were to be drafted by municipalities. By doing so, the legislator wanted to give the central government the capacity to control building regulations at local level. Today, risk mapping 
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Strengthening the decentralisation process. Flood management power transfered to the (inter)municipal bodies.
Beginning of the prevention policy. 
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New rule (Floods Directive):
New requirements for an integrated FRM.
Policy entrepreneurs: rise of intermunicipal bodies which increase their political legitimacy on FRM.
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Prevention becomes an independant field of action.
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FRMSs diversification towards mitigation. What is more, in parallel with the decentralisation process, central government is also 'deconcentrated' and has the responsibility to control actions of local authorities. In every French department, the Préfet is the main deconcentrated authority. He or she represents the central government authority at the Département level and coordinates governmental actions. Within FRMS, the Préfet is in charge of organising emergency services during natural disasters as well as informing local authorities on the existing risk. As a public authority, the Préfet takes over from the mayor when the impact of a natural disaster goes beyond municipal boundaries. Last, the Préfet gives permits for building or transformation of defence infrastructures. Authorizations for the construction and management of dams and other infrastructures to protect against flooding are issued by the prefecture.
Hence, in France, the central government clearly dominates FRG today. Legislation gives central government competences in nearly every FRM strategy and provides it with a wide variety of instruments to control FRM. It is interesting to see that, alongside the decentralisation process, the central government also introduced FRM instruments (such as the PPRi) enabling to constrain local rules for planning in flood-prone areas; therefore, its role remains very important in the general rules of the game for FRM.
Explaining forces of stability
How can we explain those forces of stability? Exposing our analysis to the lens of the theoretical framework proposed by Wiering et al. (2017) , we have identified four main explanatory factors.
First a coordination effect can be mentioned. Central government still benefits from a strong legitimacy among FRG stakeholders (or at least is considered by most stakeholders in this policy field as the main actor responsible for flood management). Since risk management is viewed as a mission of national solidarity, opportunities for actors other than the central government to engage in FRM are rather limited from a legitimacy point of view. The policy arrangement around the recovery strategy remains the most striking example. Within this strategy, private actors (i.e. insurance sector) are involved but act on behalf of central government authorities.
Central government remains the main coordinator of FRG in France. Even though competences in this field are progressively shared with other actors, central government keeps a hand on the design of the FRM policy or the identification of responsibilities and actions to launch. Central government often plays an important coordination role between all stakeholders involved in FRM at local level, keeping its role of regulator.
It can also be said that there is a 'fixed costs and increasing returns' effect as FRM in France is marked by a strong path dependency related to flood defence. This tends to make any radical change very unlikely. For several centuries, the high level of defence investment was justified by development needs, and it consequently became necessary to protect the developments those investments had enabled. Despite the fact that central government has no obligation to guarantee protection against flood, it progressively took responsibility for this along the main rivers, thereby giving defence strategy (and the central government itself ) a powerful political legitimacy.
The central government can also rely on a legal system that gives stable powers and legitimacy. The constitutional principle of national solidarity to cope with national disasters, which legitimises central government as a guarantor of public safety, is a significant example of the law as a force of stability. It is worth mentioning that the national solidarity principle was first formulated for the country's reconstruction after the First World War (as a 'national disaster') and then formalised in French constitution just after the Second World War. National solidarity is therefore applicable to disasters of all kinds (not only natural). Due to its constitutional status, this principle not only has a strong legal effect and legitimacy, but it can be affected only by a modification of the French constitution, which gives the national solidarity principle a great stability.
At last, already since the early 19th century, central government's intervention has been principally justified by the challenges of economic development (Picon et al., 2006) and more generally by the welfare state doctrine. This may be related to the construction of a modern secular state (Borraz, 2008 ) whose power does not derive from God, but from its capacity to guarantee the safety and growth of both the territory and the population. One can indeed speak of an 'adaptive expectations' effect when it comes to shock events, as they clearly tend to strengthen the legitimacy of the central government. Since 1982, flood events have legitimised the traditional centralised and security-oriented policy. This was the case after the 2010 Xynthia storm, which led to the use of exceptional resources by the central government.
In this first results' section, we have described the reasons why we can compare the central government as a Goliath within French FRM. However, it is also quite important to identify the drivers for change which have incrementally been taking place in the last decades.
Result 2: assessing and explaining change in French FRG Change: when David grasps all opportunities to challenge the giant As stated above, two main drivers for change can be identified.
First, from a historical perspective, it is important to recall the major diversification of FRMS which has been taking place since the 1980s, from a technical to a more comprehensive approach of flood risk. As it has been described by researchers (Barraqué, 2014) , technical solutions that had been adopted to protect the national territory have made way for diversified approaches, tools, actors and discourses.
For centuries, defence and preparation strategies were the core of the flood policy, mainly dominated by national authorities. It is only in the beginning of the 1980s that the prevention strategy came to the forefront with the creation of a compensation policy introduced in 1982 (CAT-NAT system: national solidarity fund for natural disasters). This marked the starting point for a new flood risk policy (Ledoux, 2006) . In the 1990s, risk prevention became an independent field of action, still dominated by central government. As explained previously, the Flood Risk Prevention Plan (PPRi), introduced in 1995, has affirmed the central government's responsibility in this domain.
However, with the diversification of FRMS, other public stakeholders have started to be invested, voluntarily and without any binding legislation. In the end of the 1990s, municipalities and some other public bodies (such as the water agencies) have started to test mitigation measures. First, methodologies to assess vulnerability of housing or industrial premises to flood risks have been experimented. In the beginning of the 2000s, the so-called measures for the reduction of vulnerability have started to be promoted. They represent a new policy domain. Some public stakeholders have also started to promote innovative projects of adaptive housing. In addition, general discourse on the defence strategy has progressively evolved. Little by little, traditional protection systems (dikes and dams) were criticised. An inventory of dikes and dams has revealed that hundreds of kilometres of dikes are in bad conditions and provide low protection levels. Mitigation measures have started to be promoted as additional measures. Retention basins, discharge channels, and so on are now considered to be the 'soft' part of the protection infrastructures. Therefore, since the beginning of the 1990s, there has been a wide diversification of FRM strategies. The central government administration has taken part of this diversification process but it is important to see that it also has also given an opportunity for local authorities to launch innovative urban project, enabling urbanisation in flood-prone areas, while the central government imposes strict rules for construction. Today, all across the country, experiments are initiated by municipalities to promote estates with adapted housing or mitigation infrastructures.
Second, the vast redistribution of power and competences which has taken place since the 1980s has incrementally transferred powers to lower territorial levels. Today, municipalities in particular have several competences directly linked to FRM. Their first responsibility is to ensure the safety of their own citizens on their administrative territory. The municipal police powers also make the mayor a key authority responsible for civil security. The second major competence is the elaboration of the local planning document (Plan local d'Urbanisme) which has to integrate the natural and industrial risks in its development strategy. Mayors also have the responsibility to deliver building permits to citizens and companies. This competence in land and urban planning is very important as the mayor can refuse a permit accordingly to the acceptable level of flood risk. Eventually, communes also have the obligation to set up emergency planning documents (Plan Communal de Sauvegarde) and some informative documents on risk (Document d'Information Communal sur les Risques Majeurs). Such empowerment of local governments will be again legally reinforced in the near future by the creation of the GEMAPI competence (competence for the management of aquatic environments and flood prevention: Gestion des Milieux Aquatiques et Prévention des Inondations) in 2016 (cf. Figure 1) . This competence has been transferred to municipalities with the 2014 MAPTAM law (devoted to the modernisation of public action at local level: Loi de Modernisation de l'Action Publique Territoriale et d'Affirmation des Métropoles) This mandatory competence obliges municipalities to maintain the banks, rivers and lakes; to develop watersheds; to restore aquatic environments; and to defend against floods and against the sea. In this context, political cooperation between municipalities is becoming a solution to manage natural risks and flood management. In general, since 1999 Chevènement Law, central government has strongly encouraged the constitution of intermunicipal cooperation organisations (EPCI, Etablissements Publics de Coopération Intercommunale) with a single budget. Municipalities are now forced to merge into much larger units by the latest law (NOTRe). Competences, which may include land use planning and environmental issues, are transferred to those intermunicipal bodies. In addition to intermunicipal structures which have multiple missions and are not specialised in FRM, local authorities can delegate resources and competences to River Basin Water Boards (Etablissements Publics Territoriaux de Bassin). 4 In the last decade, the latter have progressively become major actors in FRM. Literally called 'territorial public organisations of basin', those bodies regroup, on a voluntary basis, communes within a catchment area. These basin public organisations derive from the traditional river syndicates but legislation has progressively given them an official status. In December 2006, the law on water and aquatic ecosystems reinforces their role and status. The MAPTAM law has also recognised the EPTB as a major actor.
Explaining forces of change
Here again, while confronting our analysis to the theoretical framework proposed by Wiering et al. (2017) , three factors appeared to be decisive in the dynamic of change stated above.
First, the discourse on the need for an integrated flood management progressively imposed itself. As regards to the movement towards a diversification of strategies, the concept of integrated flood management is increasingly recognised in France and there has been a clear attempt to achieve a certain consistency in the definition and implementation of flood policy at national level. The national strategy for flood risk prevention, which designs the overall direction in which the FRG is heading, relies on a mix of prevention, defence (completed by mitigation), and preparation. There is a discursive shift aiming at diversifying the set of FRMSs: 'zero risk does not exist', meaning that defence or prevention cannot work alone; all Second, the redistribution of power and responsibilities, which leads to a broadening of the set of actors in FRM (especially through the rise of urban agglomerations), can be understood by analysing the following factors. The ongoing process of decentralisation has led to a gradual empowerment of local authorities (régions, départements, municipalities and their related intermunicipal or interdepartemental bodies). Such an important force of change is based on the increasingly shared idea that public issues should be managed at the most relevant territorial scale. In short, it corresponds to the subsidiarity principle, which contributes to decisions being made as closely as possible to the citizens. This appears to be the main explanatory factor for the expansion of the set of FRM actors as well as for the diversification of FRMSs. The decentralisation process globally involves a shift of competences and responsibilities among various actors, which are encouraged to coordinate their actions.
Eventually, two other forces of change have emerged that are closely linked to the decentralisation process. On the one hand, budget restrictions on public expenses which have been engaged since the 1980s constitute a driving element for reducing interventions of the central government. On the other hand, in the context of decentralisation, the central government's financial disengagement is associated with a strengthening of interterritorial cooperation in the form of intermunicipal bodies (Larrue & Fournier, 2014) . This is the result of policy entrepreneurs who have undertaken intermunicipal initiatives to reinforce their political legitimacy through global risk management (Gralepois, 2008) . Emerging EPCI are indeed looking for ways to increase their political legitimacy, and FRM can be seen as a strategic area . At local level, long before the formal attribution of local responsibilities in FRM, several intermunicipal bodies had already taken the lead in FRM action programmes especially with the help of decentralised river Basin Water Boards which committed themselves to that issue . The development of multipartner financing tools (e.g. Action Programmes for Flood Prevention, see above) can be linked to the development of local actors' coalitions. In addition, the engagement of intermunicipal bodies is also visible from the resources granted to this specific field of competence, especially through the development of expertise ('new expertise' factor). Their increasing size provides them with new technical capacities by the pooling of resources and powers (i.e. developing new flood modelling tools and hydraulic expertise, learning good mitigation practices from international examples, etc.). This is a deliberate strategy for challenging the central government's expertise, practices and standardised solutions.
The MAPTAM law of 2014 is likely to enhance this dynamic by placing FRM under direct responsibility of new consolidated local authorities, thereby legitimising existing initiatives and their political leaders. Table 2 summarises the main forces for stability and change in the French context as explained above.
None of the dynamics described above can be seen as radical and fundamental changes; they emerge from a shifting balance of the actors' powers and resources. They comply with the idea of duality of structure which constraints both actors at the same time (in reference to Giddens, 1984 , quoted in Wiering et al., 2017 . The current limitations in the development of the mitigation strategy in France 4 River Basin Water Boards gather municipalities but also départements and regions at the river basin level, and develop interterritorial cooperation dedicated to water management including floods management. typically illustrate this situation. Although this strategy is promoted in discourses, the resources, instruments and powers which are made available do not really support it. Hence, it could be said that French FRG is torn apart between centralisation and decentralisation. While the central government retains control on certain important sectors (such as the solidarity system, risk planning, and crisis management), local authorities are incrementally asserting their roles in the development and implementation of policy goals.
Discussion: will David defeat Goliath?
In the previous sections, we tried to explain how both stability and change trends are taking place at the same time.
In order to appreciate the sustainability of the changes, we must analyse in a more dynamic way the existing tension between centralisation and decentralisation in France and its impact on FRG. Today, French FRM appears to be in transition, with a process which is still in mid-stream. Taking this into account, the tension between the two dynamics (centralisation versus decentralisation) produces an erratic (unstable) FRG that can vary from one location to another. For example, the cases of Nice and Le Havre, studied within the STAR-FLOOD project, illustrate the intermunicipal capacity to integrate the risk of flooding into their urban development policy and to use it to develop both their political and technical legitimacy and their capacity.
More generally, the central government is hardly changing the conception of its role in FRM. Discourses as well as rules are developed around the idea of protecting general interest against local and specific ones. For instance, the central government took the opportunity of the implementation of the European Floods Directive to reinforce its own power by taking over the responsibility of elaboration of local strategy in those areas under important flood risk. Then, local actors are in most cases seen by central government as implementers of flood policy, not as formulators. However, local capacity building is strengthened, and this trend will be even more reinforced by the MAPTAM law of 2014, which will be implemented on January 1, 2018.
Eventually, this competition scheme tends to produce discrepancies between local situations. In areas where local actors (especially in large cities) are interested in developing their own FRMSs and benefit from sufficient resources (human, technical, financial, etc.), central government representatives must come to a compromise with local actors. In areas where local actors benefit from fewer local resources, central government authorities can still dominate (as in the case of Nevers, a small city, one of the examples analysed in the STAR-FLOOD Project ).
In short, the decentralisation process has been providing tools for local public authorities to build a local strategy and tackle the flood issue in a global approach. Still, in order to be able to grasp those tools, local authorities must be resourceful.
That is why changes in FRG in France looks like a David and Goliath story: the central government remains a Goliath equipped with many resources, whereas local authorities are not as fully equipped. However, unlike the dramatic ending of the biblical story, the end is not so obvious and easy to anticipate. It seems that the on-going processes can still be beneficial for both sides and some external factors (shock events, a new decentralisation process) could still redefine the French FRG.
Today, one can witness several patterns of FRM at local level, some under the lead of local governments and bodies, while others stay under the lead of central government. Such discrepancies question the traditional role of central government: will/should it concentrate its resources on localities not capable to face the risk issue alone and play a 'remote government' role for the others? In fact, this does not seem to be the on-going trend.
As mentioned earlier in our paper, following the Floods Directive, French central government has decided to reinforce its own power by taking over responsibility on the definition of local FRM plans and local strategies (related to high flood risk areas). Those plans and strategies are not covering all French flood-prone areas, but mainly the large urban areas which concentrate human and economic issues (122 urban areas have been identified in total). It is often in those areas that local authorities (municipalities and EPCI) are also the most innovative and pro-active to integrate the flood risk issue in their urban development projects. Consequently, in this context, we may predict a two-speed flood risk policy in the years to come, with most resources and investments by both central government and powerful local authorities concentrated in those urban areas while many other territories may keep on a more traditional pattern.
